Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service Providers by Fritts, Emily K.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 93 | Issue 3 Article 6
2005
Internet Libel and the Communications Decency
Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted
Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of
Internet Service Providers
Emily K. Fritts
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fritts, Emily K. (2005) "Internet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted
Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service Providers," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 93 : Iss. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol93/iss3/6
NOTES
Internet Libel and the Communications
Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously
Interpreted Congressional Intent with
Regard to Liability of Internet Service
Providers
BY EMILY K. FRITTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.'
W hile First Amendment absolutists may argue that "no law"
means just what it says "without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or
'whereases,"' in practical application the absolute terms of the First
Amendment have never garnered an absolute right for the people. In
fact, the amendment "has never meant ... that people can say whatever
they want wherever they want.",3 Undoubtedly, the Framers intended to
target the two main controls on speech that they endured in England: the
licensing system's prior restraint on publication and punishment for
seditious libel.4 However, according to Professor Chemerinsky,
"[b]eyond this . . . there is little indication of what the framers
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank Professor
Richard Labunski of the University of Kentucky School of Journalism and
Telecommunications for suggesting the topic and providing subsequent insights and
advice.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 MADELINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 3 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)).
3 William Bennett Turner, What Part of "No Law" Don't You Understand?, WIRED,
Mar. 1996, http://www.wired.conwiredlarchive/4.03/no.law.html, reprinted in William
Bennett Turner, The First Amendment and the Internet, attachment 1, at 482 PLI/P at 33,
59.
4 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 893 (2d
ed. 2002).
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intended."' Thus, in order to determine the constitutionality of
government restrictions, the all-important question becomes "whether
the particular 'speech' [at issue] is within the 'freedom' comprehended
by the amendment. 6
A judicially constructed analytical hierarchy of speech has emerged
throughout the course of First Amendment jurisprudence. In accordance
with this "non-absolutist" theory, the courts recognize various areas of
unprotected speech including fighting words,7 obscenity,8 and incitement
of illegal activity. 9 Additionally, the courts recognize a category of
speech worthy of some, but not absolute, First Amendment protection.
Such speech includes commercial speech,' symbolic speech,11 and
defamation.12 But at the core of the First Amendment's protection rests
political speech. Often, "[t]he Supreme Court has spoken of the ability to
criticize government and government officers as 'the central meaning of
the First Amendment."13
Despite this tidy First Amendment hierarchy, the debate continues as
to whether certain other areas of speech should be protected. With the
emergence of new media outlets like the Internet, courts have been faced
5 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 893-94.
6 Turner, supra note 3, at 59.
7 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include.. . 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.").
8 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court stated that:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance ... have the
full protection of the guaranties . . . . But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance . . . . We hold that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press.
Id. at 484-85.
9 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (recognizing that,
consistent with the First Amendment, states may forbid or proscribe the incitement of
illegal activity "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
1o See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (stating that the First Amendment "accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression").
11 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("This Court has
held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.").
12 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The
constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice .... ').
13 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 897 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273).
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with the difficult issue of determining whether the same rules should
apply in cyberspace as have been applied to the print and broadcast
media.
Generally, this note will focus on how the courts have applied
defamation law with regard to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") both
before and after Congress passed the Communications Decency Act
("CDA") of 1996.14 Part I provides a brief overview of the common law
of defamation.' 5 Part III discusses Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 16 and
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 17-two important
Internet libel cases decided prior to passage of the CDA. 18 Part IV
explains § 230 of the CDA, an effort by Congress to preempt Stratton
Oakmont, focusing on both the text of the statute and the legislative
history. 19 Two major Internet libel cases, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
20
and Blumenthal v. Drudge,21 emerging post-CDA are critiqued in Part
V.22 Part IV presents an illustrative case, wherein it becomes apparent
that Congress never intended the CDA to be interpreted as it was in
23Zeran. Finally, Part VII argues that the courts have erroneously
interpreted the CDA and that Congress should step in, as it did after the
Stratton Oakmont decision, with a clearer mandate for the courts a
mandate that is more in line with the traditional common law of
defamation in the United States.24
II. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
14 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)).
15 See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
16 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
18 See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
20 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
21 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
22 See infra notes 79-115 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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And makes me poor indeed.25
Evidently our society agrees with the above assertion because
liability exists to compensate the victim of the tort of defamation, also
called "speech injurious to reputation."26 There are two forms of
defamation: libel and slander. While libel deals with the printed word
and slander with the spoken,27 this note focuses solely on libel.
Constitutional considerations naturally arise regarding defamation
and it is worth noting that "recovery for defamation ... is limited by the
First Amendment.",28 The ultimate "challenge for the Court in this area is
to balance the need to protect reputation, the obvious central concern of
defamation law, with the desire to safeguard expression, which can be
chilled and limited by tort liability., 29 There are two ways the courts
have attempted to strike this all-important balance: the first focuses on
the status and actions of the plaintiff ° and the second on those of the
defendant.3 1
The plaintiffs status and actions determine the standard by which
the defendant's conduct will be judged in a defamation suit. For
example, the Court has held that, in order for a public official or public
figure to succeed in a defamation suit, he or she must show a higher level
of fault than a private figure is required to show.32 Public officials and
public figures alike have sought the limelight, whether by running for
political office and "appear[ing] to the public to have[] substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs"
33
or by "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
25 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 3, sc. 3 (quoted in SCHACHTER, supra note
2, at 271).
26 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 1007.
27 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 271.
28 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 1008 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)).
29 Id. at 1008.
30 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
32 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 327 (1974) (holding that private figures need
not show actual malice as "the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for the [defamer of] a private individual"); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that a "[plublic figure who is not a public official may
recover damages for [defamation] on a showing of ... extreme departure from standards
of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers"); Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 283 (holding that public officials must prove actual malice to recover
damages for defamation).
33 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
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involved., 34 Thus, the Court has tagged each individual that steps onto
the public stage with an implied acceptance of the increased exposure to
and "risk of injury from defamatory falsehood. 35
In addition to this "acceptance of the risk" rationale, the Court has
recognized that both "[p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements then [sic] private individuals normally enjoy. '3 6 Furthermore,
the subject matter of speech relating to public officials and public figures
will most likely be "relevant to the political process and of public
interest," just the type of speech many argue the First Amendment is
designed to protect.
3 7
The second aspect of the defamation analysis, and the primary focus
of the remainder of this note, is the status of the defendant: the publisher
or distributor. "A 'publisher' is an entity, such as a book or newspaper
publisher, who is responsible for the creation or editing of content in a
publication. A 'distributor' is an entity, such as a bookseller or library,
that makes publications available to the public. 38 In order to establish
liability against a publisher, such as a newspaper or an original author, a
plaintiff need not show that the publisher was "aware of the content of
the specific utterance that is the subject of the suit."3 9 Publishers of
defamatory statements made by third parties are treated as having
"'adopted' the statement as [their] own." 40 However, distributors are held
to a less strict standard of liability and are "not deemed responsible for
defamatory statements contained in the materials they distribute unless
they knew or had reason to know that the material was defamatory.""' In
fact, distributors are under no "duty to examine publications prior to
offering them for sale" in order to determine whether or not they contain
defamatory material.4 a Thus, there is an added knowledge requirement
for defendants deemed to be distributors.
Adherence to the status distinction reflects a judicial desire to
increase the public's ability to access information by "alleviat[ing] the
14 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
35 id.
36 Id. at 344.
37 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 1018.
38 David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L.
REv. 147, 150 (1997).
39 id.
40 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 275.
41 Id. (citing Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wa.
1992)).
42 Id. (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455,463 (E.D. Cal. 1979)).
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otherwise inevitable timidity of distributors to disperse material that
might subject them to liability. '43 For example, it would be irrational to
expect a bookstore owner to read every book on his shelf to ensure that
no defamatory material is present. It would be equally irrational to hold a
librarian accountable for defamatory comments penned by authors of
books in her library. Liability in such circumstances would do little to
protect the reputations harmed and would undoubtedly cause the
bookStore 'wier and the librarian to shut their doors, thereby chilling
free speech and inhibiting the ability of the public to have access to
information. As a result, the courts rely on this status distinction between
publishers and disfributors in order to strike the appropriate balance
between freedom of speech and protection of individual reputations.
Although the historical reasons behind the Court's status distinction
between publisher and distributor liability are clear, this same distinction
is a problem for the courts in their interpretation of ISP defamation
liability.,
III. INTERNET LIBEL CASES PRIOR TO THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT
A. Traditional Libel Standards Recognized in Cyberspace: Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc. 4
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the court applied traditional libel
standards to- assess the liability of an ISP. 45 The case dealt with the
posting of allegedly defamatory material by a third party on the ISP's
bulletin board. In granting the defendant ISP's motion for summary
judgment, the court found that the ISP had acted as a distributor, not a
publisher, and thus could not be held liable for the defamatory material
because it possessed no knowledge of the statements.46 "New York
courts have long held that ... distributors of defamatory publications are
not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of the
defamation. A 7 The court determined that such a requirement "is deeply
rooted in the First Amendment" for "'[t]he constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing'
strict liability on distributors for the contents of the reading materials
41 Id. at 276.
44 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
41 Id. at 139 ("Ordinarily, one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory
matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.") (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS § 578 (1977)).46 Id. at 140-41.
47 Id. at 139 (quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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they carry., 48 The court reasoned that to apply a stricter standard of
liability on an ISP "than that which is applied to a public library, book
store, or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of
information," thus tilting the balance the courts had worked so hard to
attain.49
Therefore, according to Cubby, distributor liability is the appropriate
libel standard to apply to ISPs. 50 Application of this standard makes
sense considering the "speed with which information is gathered and
processed" on the Internet and, in particular, on bulletin boards.5 It
further makes sense in light of the fact that we do not expect bookstore
owners to read the thousands of books in their shops.52 Surely courts
would not expect Internet bulletin board operators to sift through the
millions of messages posted daily in search of defamatory material.53
Cubby is therefore significant for paving the way for the application of
traditional defamation principles, such as the publisher/distributor
distinction, in the age of the Internet.
B. In Search of Someone to Blame in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
54
While the decision in Cubby seems rational and Was met with little
opposition, a subsequent case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., attempted to dictate the circumstances in. which an ISP
could be deemed a publisher and, in doing so, caught the attention of
Congress. In October 1994, an unidentified user of the ISP Prodigy
posted a message on one of Prodigy's bulletin boards about Stratton
Oakmont, an investment banking firm. The original speaker of the posted
message was unknown and could not be determined, but the firm sought
compensation for the allegedly defamatory statements by filing a $200
million libel suit against Prodigy.55 While Cubby held flatly that ISPs are
distributors, in Stratton Oakmont Justice Stuart Ain held that if an ISP
takes affirmative steps to exercise editorial control over the contents of
48 Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959)).
49 Id. at 140.
50 Id. at 140-41.
"' See id. at 140.
52 See id.
53 See discussion of Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ("P[rodigy] argues that in terms of sheer
volume-currently 60,000 messages a day are posted on P[rodigy] bulletin boards-
manual review of messages is not feasible."), infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
14 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710.
55 RICHARD LABUNSKI, THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: HOW THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN TAKE BACK THEIR GOVERNMENT 247 (2000).
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the bulletin board it should be deemed a publisher rather than a
distributor for purposes of libel.56
Despite agreeing with the holding in Cubby, Justice Ain
distinguished Stratton Oakmont on two counts. "First, [the ISP] held
itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its
computer bulletin boards. Second, [the ISP] implemented this control
through its automatic software screening" technology as well as bulletin
board leaders who were required to delete certain material.57 Both
controls were designed to "delete notes from its computer bulletin boards
on the basis of offensiveness and 'bad taste." 58 Justice Ain reasoned that
because "P[rodigy] has uniquely reserved to itself the role of determining
what is proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards," it
has altered the scenario present in Cubby and "mandated the finding that
it is a publisher."'59
Justice Ain focused on the fact that Prodigy "virtually created an
editorial staff . . [with] the ability to continually monitor incoming
transmissions and . . . censor[] notes., 60 Because the ISP voluntarily
shouldered the editorial responsibilities of a publisher and notified the
public that it was doing so,61 Justice Ain believed it was only right to
attach to the ISP the same liability a publisher would face.62 Despite
Justice Ain's controversial position, he did recognize the potential that
freedom of speech would be chilled on the Internet if courts attached
publisher liability to ISPs in such circumstances. Even so, he offered
reasons why such a chill would not take place. Justice Ain suggested that
the market would react positively to ISPs that control the content of their
bulletin boards and he presumed that Prodigy, as well as other ISPs,
could attempt to "attract ... users seeking a 'family-oriented' computer
service.
6 3
After Cubby and Stratton Oakmont, ISPs were subject to publisher
liability for libel if they exercised editorial control over the content of
56 See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
51 Id. at *4.
581d.
59 Id. at *4, *5.
60 Id. at *5.
61 Id. at *2 (citing Exhibits I and J to plaintiffs' moving papers). In one newspaper
article P[rodigy] stated:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the
millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible
newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the
letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.
Id.
62 Id. at *4.
63 id. at *5.
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their bulletin boards, and were treated as distributors if they did nothing
to control the content. Based on these standards it seems reasonable to
think that ISPs aware of defamation liability standards would do nothing
to guard against defamation instead of taking a proactive stance and
risking an encounter with a court willing to follow Justice Ain's lead.
However, Stratton Oakmont was not the end of the story. As Justice Ain
noted, his decision might be "preempted by federal law if the
Communications Decency Act . . . is enacted."64 As it turns out, Justice
Ain's hunch was correct.
IV. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
In an effort to "promote competition and reduce regulation" of the
Internet and other emerging telecommunications technologies, Congress
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996," Title V of which is
known as the Communications Decency Act. Congress viewed the
Internet as a vast "educational and information resource[]" and desired to
"preserve the vibrant and competitive free market . . .unfettered by
Federal or State regulation." 66 Furthermore, Congress viewed Justice
Ain's holding in Stratton Oakmont as a major impediment to
accomplishing such a goal.67
A. Text of Section 230
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protects
individuals and ISPs engaged in the "blocking and screening of offensive
material."6t While Justice Ain contended that such voluntary action
should be accompanied by publisher liability, Congress made clear in
§ 230(c)(1) that publisher liability is inappropriate for a "provider or user
of an interactive computer service., 69 Indeed, Congress went even further
by indicating its desire to protect from civil liability, not to punish, ISPs
that make an effort to edit their bulletin boards for "objectionable"
conduct. 70 These provisions have become widely known as the "Good
4 id.
65 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
66 Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C § 230(a)(1), (b)(2) (1996).
67 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996).
6' 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Section 230(c), entitled "Protection for 'good samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material," is the main source of these protections in
the CDA.
69 § 230(c)(1). The specific text reads: "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider." Id. (emphasis added).
'0 § 230(c)(2)(A). The text of the statute limiting civil liability reads:
2004-2005]
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Samaritan" laws.7 Thus, Congress effectively overruled Stratton
Oakmont by mandating that ISPs are not to be treated as publishers for
purposes of libel simply because they undertake some editorial
responsibilities with regard to the content of their bulletin boards.72
B. Legislative History of Section 230
The Senate Conference Report describes the "Good Samaritan" laws
as protecting ISPs from civil liability "for actions to restrict ... access to
objectionable online material. 73 Such actions undoubtedly refer to the
editorial responsibilities upon which Justice Ain placed so much
emphasis in Stratton Oakmont. The report goes on to assert that "[o]ne of
the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont...
and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because
. . . ,74
they have restricted access to objectionable material. Thus, the Senate
Conference Report is consistent with the words of the text and
reemphasizes the point that ISPs will not be deemed publishers merely
because they have voluntarily undertaken some editorial responsibilities.
Furthermore, comments made by lawmakers reaffirm the notion that
the intent of Congress in enacting § 230 was merely to overrule the
Stratton Oakmont decision. Representative Barton of Texas stated that
§ 230 was intended to provide ISPs "a reasonable way to... help them
self-regulate," suggesting that the Stratton Oakmont decision
discouraged ISPs from combating Internet libel for fear that they would
be labeled publishers rather than distributors.75 In analyzing the unique
circumstances of ISPs, Representative Goodlatte of Virginia implicitly
rejected the use of publisher liability by noting the differences between
newspapers and bulletin boards:
(2) Civil Liability
No Provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.
Id. 7 1 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194.
72 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)-(2).
73 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 194.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 141 CONG. REc. H8460-01, *H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Barton).
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There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take the
responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in to
them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin board. We are
talking about something that is far larger than our daily newspaper. We
are talking about something that is going to be thousands of pages of
information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is
76wrong.
Representative Goodlatte's statement again focuses on the irrationality of
imposing publisher liability on ISPs and highlights the reasons typically
given for imposing distributor liability: enormous amounts of material
from numerous sources.
The text and the legislative history of the CDA appear to clearly
indicate Congress's intent. Quite simply, it appears that the primary
focus of § 230 was to overrule Stratton Oakmont and to ensure that
courts would not impose publisher liability on ISPs merely because they
voluntarily chose to edit the content of their bulletin boards. In the words
of Representative Goodlatte, such an imposition would be "wrong.,
77
While § 230 of the CDA clarified an important aspect of the potential
liability of ISPs as publishers in libel cases, it is important to note that
§ 230 does not affect distributor liability and leaves the Cubby decision
intact.78
V. INTERNET LIBEL CASES POST-COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Despite what appears to be a clear mandate from Congress that ISPs
should not be treated as publishers for purposes of libel merely because
they have undertaken editorial responsibilities, the courts have declined
to interpret § 230 in such a manner. In fact, in both Zeran v. America
Online, Inc. 79 and Blumenthal v. Drudge,80 the courts have expanded
§ 230 beyond what was intended by Congress, ignoring traditional libel
law and tipping the balance between protection of reputation and
protection of speech even further in the direction of the latter.
A. Ignoring Distributor Liability: Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
Zeran was the first case to interpret § 230 of the CDA. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment to America Online
("AOL") in a suit brought by a Seattle resident alleging unreasonable
76 ld. at *H8471.
77 id.
78 See Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
79 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
80 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
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delay in the removal of defamatory comments from the ISP's bulletin
board."
On April 25, 1995, a message was posted to an AOL bulletin board
advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" featuring "offensive and
tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City." The prank came less than a
week after the bombing. In addition to the advertisement, the unknown
user listed the plaintiff, Zeran, and his home telephone number as the
contact for interested buyers. Because of the "prank, Zeran received a
high volume of calls, comprised primarily of angry and derogatory
messages, but also including death threats." Zeran notified AOL of the
bulletin board posting and requested its removal. However, despite
AOL's repeated removal of the defamatory posting, the unknown user
continued to re-post the "advertisement." Five days after the initial
posting "Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately every
two minutes." By.May 14, nearly three weeks after the initial posting, the
calls had only "subsided to fifteen per day.",
82
Initially, Zeran brought suit against AOL, charging that the ISP
"unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an
unidentified third party, refused to post retractions of those messages,
and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter." 3 AOL invoked
§ 230 of the CDA as an affirmative defense, claiming that the Act
shielded ISPs from liability for defamatory messages posted to their
bulletin boards.8 4 The district court found the defendant's argument
based on the CDA persuasive and granted AOL's motion for judgment
on the pleadings.8 5 The Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed. 6
While this case may appear at first glance to fit nicely within the
congressional mandate of § 230, upon closer analysis it is clear that
Zeran is not a case about publisher liability for ISPs. Zeran did not ask
the court to impose liability upon AOL merely because it edited content
on its bulletin boards, a claim that would be governed by § 230. Instead,
Zeran contended that AOL was liable as a distributor because it had
knowledge of the defamatory material and failed to remove it
accordingly. Thus, this case does not deal with publisher liability as
outlined in § 230, but with distributor liability, an area not preempted by
§ 230. Such a distinction is important because, under distributor liability
standards, AOL could be held accountable upon a showing that it had
81 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29.
82 Id. at 329.
" Id. at 328.
14 1d. at 329.
" Id. at 330.
86 Id. at 328.
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knowledge that the material was defamatory and failed to take action,
consistent with Zeran's claims. 87 Nonetheless, in Zeran the Fourth
Circuit mixed distributor liability with publisher liability, giving ISPs
blanket immunity against defamatory material posted by third parties on
their bulletin boards.
The Zeran court recognized the fact that § 230 "precludes courts
from entertaining claims that would place a[n ISP] in a publisher's
role., 88 However, it rejected the plaintiffs argument that "the [§] 230
immunity eliminates only publisher liability, leaving distributor liability
intact, '89 disagreeing with the plaintiff's assertion that "Congress' use of
only the term 'publisher' in [§] 230 indicates a purpose to immunize
service providers only from publisher liability."0 Instead, the court
illogically reasoned that when Congress said "publisher" it meant to
include "distributor" as well because "[distributor] liability is merely a
subset, or a species, of publisher liability."
91
Rather than recognizing the distinct categories of "publisher" and
"distributor" that are a traditional staple of defamation law, the court
manipulated the term "publication" by citing to the Restatement instead
of looking to cases for resolution of the distinction.92 Relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b), the court argued that "only one
who publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability" because
publication is an element defamation.93 However, this logic completely
ignores the distinction between the element of publication, a requirement
relating solely to whether or not material has been published or
communicated to the public, and the labels of "publisher" and
"distributor," which identify the defendant based on his conduct. These
inquiries are distinct. Thus, while a distributor might be "charged with
publication"94 upon knowledge of the material and thereby held liable for
defamation, such defendants are not identified as publishers for purposes
of defamation law merely because the material has been published. In
fact, such a spin on defamation law ignores a central holding in Cubby:
that the appropriate standard for ISPs, and other "electronic news
distributors" who do not or cannot monitor all the information on their
sites, is distributor liability.95 While Cubby was merely persuasive
authority for the Fourth Circuit, the court failed to recognize the basic
t 7 See id. at 331.
18 id. at 330.
89 !d. at 331.
90 /d. at 332.
91 Id
92 id.
93 Id.
94 id.
95 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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tenets of traditional defamation law. The Fourth Circuit instead claimed
that Zeran "simply attach[es] too much importance" to the labels and
contends that both a publisher and a distributor fall into a "larger
publisher category.,
96
Furthermore, the court seemed to ignore the fact that § 230 does
nothing to overrule Cubby and other traditional distributor cases9 7 which
should have been persuasive to the outcome in Zeran. As David R.
Sheridan notes in an article discussing the fallacies of the Zeran decision,
"[i]t would be reasonable to surmise that Congress would say
'distributor' in addition to 'publisher' if it meant 'distributor' in addition
to 'publisher."'9. Congress did not make such a statement, choosing
instead to say "publisher" only. 99 The Zeran court, on the other hand,
determined that even distributor liability, or liability upon notice, would
have "a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech."' 00' However,
the court does not support this assertion anywhere in its opinion. In fact,
the court recognizes that the apparent purpose of § 230 was to prevent
the chill on speech that would result if ISPs were required to "screen
each of their millions of postings for possible problems"°'0 -a purpose
that would not be furthered if liability upon notice was imposed. Instead,
a liability-upon-notice system would only hold an ISP liable when it had
knowledge of defamatory material. The Zeran court claimed to be
following the mandates of Congress, but it actually departed from
traditional libel law. The problem with such a departure is that the
blanket immunity created in Zeran
provide[s] aii unprecedented means for irresponsible individuals to
cause damage by propagating false and defamatory statements around
the world at the speed of light. Broad immunity from liability for
defamation is consistent with, if perhaps not essential to, the Internet's
ethic of free speech. However, broad immunity represents a value
judgment not to be made lightly by Congress or to be inferred by a
court from a..statute that does not explicitly confer it and from
contradictory signals in the legislative history and expressed intent of
the statute. Unless and until Congress acts more clearly, courts should
continue to resolve cases involving alleged distributor liability
according to traditional tort principles, which provide extensive, but not
Absolute, protection for those who make publications available to
others.1
0 2
96 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
97 See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
98 Sheridan, supra note 38, at 168.
" Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
'0 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
' Id. at 331.
102 Sheridan, supra note 38, at 151-52.
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Zeran is not consistent with traditional concepts of libel law or with
the legislative intent underlying § 230 of the CDA. Its holding departs
from and confuses these basic concepts. As a result, so long as Congress
does not expressly ban distributor liability for ISPs, the holding of Cubby
should stand and ISPs with knowledge of defamatory material, like AOL
in Zeran, should be held accountable.
B. Extending the Zeran Decision Beyond Bulletin Boards: ISPs with
Contractual Obligations
The next major case to take a stab at interpreting § 230 of the CDA
was Blumenthal v. Drudge.10 3 In 1997, Matt Drudge, a "cyber-joumalist"
whose claim to fame includes being the first to break the Monica
Lewinsky scandal to the public, signed a deal with AOL. The contract
provided that Drudge's gossip column "The Drudge Report," would be
made available to all AOL members for one year, and in return Drudge
would receive a monthly payment of $3000.'0 4
On August 10, 1997, Drudge wrote a story claiming that Clinton
assistant Sidney Blumenthal had abused his spouse in the past. 0 5 The
story was made available to AOL subscribers pursuant to the contract.
However, the following day, "[a]fter receiving a letter from
[Blumenthal's] counsel . .. Drudge retracted the story," and on August
12, 1997, AOL posted the retraction. 106 As it turned out, Drudge's
sources had fabricated the story. Nevertheless, Blumenthal sought to
hold AOL and Drudge accountable, basing his complaint on the
contractual relationship between the two.10 7 AOL again invoked the
protection of § 230 of the CDA, and the Blumenthal court granted
summary judgment for the ISP.0 g
Much like Zeran, Blumenthal appears at first glance to fall squarely
within the mandates of § 230. However, the facts in Blumenthal are
distinct from the facts of Zeran, Stratton Oakmont, and Cubby---each of
which dealt with postings made to bulletin boards and the liability of the
ISPs that controlled them. Blumenthal, on the other hand, dealt with a
contract existing between a third-party producer of information, Drudge,
and an ISP, AOL. In these altogether different circumstances, AOL was
not faced with the burden of examining "thousands of pages of
103 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
'04 Id. at 47.
"05 Id. at 47-48 & n.4.
106 Id. at 48.
'07 Id. at 50.
'
0
' Id. at 46.
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information every day" coming from unknown sources. 10 9 Rather, AOL
knew the nature of Drudge's column when it entered into the contract
with the writer. After all, AOL "affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new
source of unverified instant gossip."."0 In fact, the contract was
comparable to those made between writers and publishers in the
traditional world of print.
The applicability of § 230 to a contractual situation between an ISP
and the original source of defamatory material is a completely different
inquiry than that involved in Zeran. As some contend, "[i]t is one thing
to argue that AOL is not responsible for monitoring the huge number of
messages that pass through its facilities every day; it is something else to
assert that it did not have the staff available to read Drudge's copy before
it was posted on the AOL site even though Drudge was under
contract." '' Similarly, Blumenthal made the argument that "[s]ection
230 of the [CDA] does not provide immunity to AOL in this case
because Drudge was not just an anonymous person who sent a message
over the Internet through AOL," but was instead a contractual partner of
AOL. 12 However, believing it was bound by § 230, the court dismissed
AOL from the suit."l
3
Blumenthal is another example of a court erroneously interpreting
§ 230. As a House of Representatives Conference Report notes, ISPs
should be protected from liability for "Good Samaritan" efforts "to
restrict ... access to objectionable online material," and should not be
treated as publishers simply "because they have restricted access to
objectionable material." ' 14 However, § 230 does not address the situation
present in Blumenthal, where an ISP actually served as a publisher by
entering into a contract with a writer. The goal of § 230 was to prevent
obstacles to self-regulation of Internet content. Nowhere in the text of
the statute or in its legislative history does Congress mention a desire to
provide blanket immunity for ISPs as the Blumenthal court's holding
implies. Such an interpretation is erroneous and overbroad. The court
should not have applied § 230 and should instead have followed its
instincts by deeming AOL a publisher." 5
109 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 281 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01, H84-1
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)).
110 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
... LAHUNSKI, supra note 55, at 255.
112 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
"3 See id. at 53. The Blumenthal court indicated that they were led to the disputed
result because they believed § 230 constrained them: "If it were writing on a clean slate,
this Court would agree with plaintiffs." Id. at 51.
"' H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (quoted in Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52
n. 13) (emphasis omitted).
H" Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
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VI. FOLLOWING THE ZERAN DECISION: ANOTHER COURT IS LED
ASTRAY
In Doe v. America Online, Inc.,116 the Supreme Court of Florida
relied exclusively on Zeran"17 in determining that the ISP could not be
held liable as a distributor when it failed to remove, upon notice,
defamatory material posted by a third party.' 18 The third party in Doe
used AOL chat rooms to market child pornography. 119 AOL was made
aware of the communications, but the ISP "neither warned [the user] to
stop nor suspended his service."120 While not required to follow Fourth
Circuit precedent, the Supreme Court of Florida opted blindly to follow
the Zeran decision.12' As the dissent pointed out, following Zeran as the
majority did "frustrates the core concepts explicitly furthered by the Act
and contravenes its express purposes."
The Doe dissent argues that neither the statute nor its legislative
history "reflect an intent to totally exonerate and insulate an ISP from
responsibility where ... it is alleged that an ISP has acted as a knowing
distributor., 123 In particular, Justice Lewis's dissent contends that the
"Decency Act" was never meant to protect an ISP from liability where it
knowingly distributes "material leading to the . ..sale ... of child
pornography, after having been given actual notice of the particular
activity, [and] by taking absolutely no steps to curtail continued
dissemination of the information by its specifically identified customer,
when it had the right and power to do so. ' ' 124 The intent behind the CDA
was to protect ISPs from being held accountable for sifting through the
millions of messages posted daily on their bulletin boards. Accordingly,
ISPs would not become "publishers" simply by taking a proactive
approach in the regulation of material on their bulletin boards. However,
when interpreted as in Zeran and Doe the CDA is not being used as a
shield, but as a sword to combat any and all liability for ISPs.
The dissent also takes issue with the Zeran court's reliance on
section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts12 for the proposition
that distributor liability is simply a subset of publisher liability. 26 Justice
116 Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).
117 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
118 See Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1011-12, 1017-18.
"
9 Id. at 1011.
'"Id at 1012.
121 See id at 1013, 1015, 1017, 1018.
122 Id. at 1019 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1997).
126 Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1020-21 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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Lewis asserts that section 577 does not support such a proposition and
instead cites three Florida cases that reaffirm the publisher/distributor
distinction. 27 "[T]he classic illustration of [section 577] . . . is the
situation of the tavern owner who fails to remove, after knowledge
thereof, a libelous statement about plaintiff written by another on a wall
in the restroom of his establishment."' 12 8 Instead, Justice Lewis argues
that section 581 of the Restatement "more properly defines distributor
liability, and... appears most applicable" to an ISP. 129 Section 581 deals
with the transmission of defamation published by third parties. As Justice
Lewis, points out, "the function served by the provider of an Internet
Service 'bulletin board"' more closely resembles that of a "telephone,
ticker, teletype or telegraph company," to which section 581 applies,
than "that of a physical establishment which maintains a cork bulletin
board," which is covered by the relied-upon section 577.130
Careful examination of the text of sections 577 and 581 of the
Restatement makes apparent which section is most applicable to an ISP.
Section 577(2) states, in relevant part, that "[o]ne who intentionally and
unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be
exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is
subject to liability for its continued publication.' '131 Section 581, on the
other hand, states that "one who only delivers or transmits defamatory
matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.' 132 Section 581
undoubtedly is a better fit for ISPs, and the Zeran and Doe majority's
reliance on section 577 for the proposition that distributor liability is
merely a subset of publisher liability is unfounded. Put simply, section
577 applies to publishers while 581 applies to distributors. Justice Lewis
argues that this publisher/distributor distinction "is key to an
understanding of what Congress ... intended to accomplish by enacting
the CDA."'33
So, what did Congress intend? As noted by Justice Lewis, "[w]hile
the legislative history reflects Congress's intent to 'overrule' Stratton
127 Id. at 1021 & n.10 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1021 n.12 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577(2), cmt. p, illus. 15 (1997)).
129 Id. at 1022 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
1o" Id. at 1021 n.12 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1997).
132 Id. § 581(1). This section does, however, provide an exception to the rule.
Television and radio broadcasters are assigned the higher standard of liability usually
attributed to a publisher because of their usual involvement in the production of the
programs aired. Id. § 581(2) & cmt. g.
133Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1023 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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Oakmont, there is no similar mention of a desire to 'overrule' Cubby."
' 34
Furthermore, statements from the floor debate on the matter indicate that
Congress was aware of the decision in Cubby;'35 in fact, "[t]he result of
the CDA was the re-emergence of the holding in Cubby."'3 6 Thus, "[i]f
Congress had intended absolute immunity [for ISPs], why would it state
only that no ISP 'shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider?"".
137
"[T]he legislation did not explicitly exempt ISPs from distributor
liability, and its specific reference to 'publisher or speaker' is evidence
that Congress intended to leave distributor liability intact.' ' 3 8 As Justice
Lewis asks, "[i]f blanket immunity were intended, why not state more
broadly that no ISP 'shall be held liable' for any information provided on
its service by another information content provider?"'
139
Rather than recognizing the narrowing language of § 230, the Zeran
court and others following its lead have undercut congressional intent
and expanded protection for ISPs to irrational lengths. The statement in
§ 230 of the CDA
that an ISP shall not be treated as a 'publisher or speaker' of third-party
information has been interpreted to mean not only that an ISP can never
be subject to liability for negligence as a 'publisher' of third-party
information appearing on its service, but also that an ISP can never be
subject to liability based upon its own patently irresponsible role as a
distributor who has allegedly been given actual notice of materials
published on its service by a specified customer (in furtherance of
criminal conduct ... ) by soliciting the purchase and sale of explicit
child pornography, yet has done absolutely nothing about it. 1
40
14 Id at 1024 n. 15 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
135 Justice Lewis states:
A Federal court in New York, in a case involving CompuServe, one of our
online service providers, held that CompuServe would not be liable in a
defamation case because it was not the publisher or editor of the material. It
just let everything come onto your computer without, in any way, trying to
screen it or control it.
Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting 141 CONG. REc. H8460-0l, at H84-4 (daily ed. Aug.
4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox, coauthor of § 230, referring to Cubby and distinguishing
it from Stratton Oakmont).
136 Doe, 783 So. 2d at 1024 n.15 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael H.
Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America
Online is a Good Thing, 6 RiCH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 29 (2000)) (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 1025 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) (1996)).
13 Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Developments in the Law--the Law of
Cyberspace I1, The LongArm ofCyber-Reach, 112 HAIv. L. REv. 1610, 1613 (1999)).
I39 1d. at 1025 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
4°Id at 1024 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
2004-2005] INTERNET LIBEL
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Ultimately, erroneous interpretations of the CDA as found in the Doe
majority "thrust[] Congress into the unlikely position of having enacted
legislation that encourages and protects the involvement of ISPs as silent
partners in criminal enterprises for profit."'
141
VII. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, courts have recognized the need to balance protection
of an individual's reputation with freedom of speech in the development
of defamation laws. However, when considering the implications of
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act, some courts have lost sight
of this all-important balance and given little heed to the words of the
statute. These courts interpreted the Act quite expansively to protect
economic considerations, ensuring the growth of the Internet. But what
will be the cost of this diversion from the text and intent of the CDA?
With the major holdings in Zeran 42 and Blumenthal,143 courts have
tipped the scales too far in the direction of free speech. As a result, the
goal of protecting reputation will suffer because tort law will be unable
to compensate victims for their injuries. Providing less protection for
individual reputations on the Internet makes little sense. Whereas
publishers in more traditional media outlets pay a price for voicing their
opinions, speech on the Internet comes much cheaper and is often free.
The combination of fewer structural disincentives with a shrinking
potential for liability means that speakers are likely to voice their
opinions more often, and in greater quantity, without due regard to the
content of their speech.
Furthermore, the anonymity available to users of the Internet
eliminates a major disincentive to attacking another's reputation. Users
are often identified only by screen names. While one might argue that the
same anonymity has been available for years through the use of
pseudonyms, the analogy is not wholly applicable. If a traditional
publisher was not willing to publish the work of the anonymous author,
the author would have to function as the publisher himself, bearing the
costs of such an endeavor. Empowered by the Internet, an anonymous
speaker of defamatory material may hide behind his screen name, pay
little if any cost, and freely disseminate information to the masses. The
Internet thus provides a medium to disseminate information which is
much easier and less costly, both personally and financially, than any
traditional medium. In such a cheap and user-friendly environment,
141 Id. at 1028 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
142 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
143 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
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speech is capable of flourishing just as the drafters of the CDA intended.
However, with the failure of some courts to align Internet speech with
traditional defamation law, invidious speech is likely to result.
As the Cubby court first determined, the appropriate standard to be
applied to ISPs is distributor liability) 44 While Justice Ain's decision in
Stratton Oakmont145 might have been too concerned with protecting
reputation at the cost of free speech, Congress set the balance straight
again with the Communications Decency Act. The Act, specifically
§ 230, was intended to overrule Stratton Oakmont, which attached
publisher liability to an ISP that took affirmative steps in regulating the
content of its bulletin boards. 46 Thus, all the Communications Decency
Act did was turn back the clock to Cubby and reaffirm the notion that
ISPs should be considered distributors and not publishers, lessening, but
not eliminating, their potential liability for libelous speech. The decisions
in Zeran and Blumenthal, however, not only run counter to this assertion,
but also run counter to traditional defamation analysis. Such a
construction was not the intent of Congress and, unfortunately, these
decisions have influenced similar rulings in subsequent cases requiring
an interpretation of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Thus,
the harm of this erroneous interpretation has not merely been confined to
the circuits that created it. In order to right the all-important balance
between freedom of speech and reputation, it is time for Congress to set
the record straight: the Communications Decency Act was meant to
overrule Stratton Oakmont and not Cubby. Ultimately, the
publisher/distributor distinction must continue to be used in defamation
analysis for individual reputations to receive the protection they deserve.
'44 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
145 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
146 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 193-94, 435.
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